(Crpc) Prosecution of Offenses Against the State

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(Crpc) Prosecution of Offenses Against the State
(Crpc) Prosecution of Offenses Against the State


The question of “Why is the judiciary taking so long to prosecute a terrorist who waged an attack and threatened national security” is one that we frequently hear people ask. We even hear of cases where the court freed prisoners who had committed crimes against the interests of the country or postponed the procedures. We could have also seen instances when political figures were detained or charged for making remarks critical of a specific religion that caused division and unrest in the country. These incidents make us wonder what constitutes hate speech and how these offenders are dealt with.
But to be able to respond to all of these inquiries, one must be aware of the main offences against the state as listed in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), as well as the components, extent, and procedural standards outlined in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (C.r.P.C).


Since all crimes entail some sort of conduct that disturbs the peace and tranquillity of the public, they are all considered offences against the state. In addition to general offences, some specific offences essentially entail taking direct action against the state, the government, or something connected to endangering the security of the country by starting wars, making remarks that are harmful to the unity of the country, acting in a way that harms relations with other states, etc. “Offenses against State” is the aggregate term for all of these offences.
Even though different acts and legislation define different types of offences against the state, Part VI of the IPC and many other portions of the law generally apply to all of these offences. The crucial point to remember in this situation is that some offences carry harsher penalties than others. Additionally, this makes sense given that maintaining one’s honour and integrity is a goal shared by all nations. Therefore, this category includes any offences of this nature that are directed against the people, the state, or the government, or that are particularly harmful to the maintenance of the integrity, security, and unity of the country.


Sections 121–130 of Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code include offences against the state. These provisions are designed to protect the security of the state. To safeguard it, harsh penalties like the death penalty or life in prison might be applied to those who commit crimes against the state.

It is the primary topic of any state or nation to have the right to self-preservation. The following sections of the law cover crimes against the government: Section 121 covers waging war or treason against it; Section 124 deals with assaults on high-ranking officials like the governor or president; and Sections 128 to 130 deal with aiding and abetting the escape of state or private prisoners. We’ll go over each of the sections 121 through 130 that makeup Chapter VI of the IPC, which defines offences against the state, in brief.

The underlying premise of this chapter is that all nationals are subjects of their countries, and as such, they must respect and be loyal to their governments. The purpose of these provisions of the Code is to protect and maintain the State. They also impose harsh penalties, such as the death sentence or life in prison, on those who commit crimes against the state that compromise public order, tranquillity, or national unity. These portions hold great significance since every State is entitled to the same protection and self-preservation as the subjects, and they too need protection and self-preservation.


We’ll start by talking about Sections 121–123 of the IPC. The many IPC offences connected to war waging are included in all of these sections.


The penalty for an offence relating to waging war against the Indian government is outlined in Section 121 of the Indian Penal Code. Below is a list of the contents of this section.

  • A battle needs to be waged or
  • It is necessary to make an effort to wage or
  • Someone had to have encouraged the war to be waged.
  • Against the Government of India, the war had to have been aimed.

To provide additional clarity regarding the scope of this section, it is vital to grasp the correct meaning of several of the terminology used in it.

  • When the term “Government of India” is used, it primarily refers to the Indian State, which derives its legitimacy and power from the collective consent of its citizens.
  • A further crucial term in this section is “whoever,” indicating that it can be used by both Indian nationals and foreigners alike. For example, Ajmal Kasab was found guilty of a felony as well as other offences related to his role in the 2006 Mumbai terror attacks.
  • In its strictest meaning, the term “war” refers to joining, taking part in, or organizing any kind of revolt or rebellion against the Indian government rather than to wars that occur between nations. Operation Blue Star, for example, was carried out in 1964.

For instance, if someone joins an uprising against the Indian government, they have violated the definition of an offence under this clause.

Waging war is the result of any actions that fall under one of the three categories listed above: real war, attempted war, or aiding and abetting war. Therefore, the same penalty has been imposed for all three actions. Such actions are denounced as the gravest offences against the State, which is the rationale for the same punishment. The sentence consists of the death penalty or life in prison, and in some situations, it may also include a fine.

It should be mentioned that the act of aiding and abetting occurs when someone puts their hate speech or inciting recitations against the government into practice. In the Mir Hasan Khan v. State of Bihar case, it was determined that to be found guilty under this section, a person must demonstrate that they intended to obtain weapons and ammunition and use them against State troops, with the seizure of said weapons and ammunition being a part of the planned action. This clause makes the offence cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and subject to a Sessions court trial.

It is not the same as rioting to wage war. In contrast to rioting, which happens when a rising is carried out for a private goal that only affects those involved and does not raise questions for the government, no matter how numerous or outrageous it may be, waging war against the state refers to organized rebellion that targets the government and has a general impact on the community. The aim and objective of an act of aggression against the government are seen as crucial components when it comes to waging war.

The accused individuals do not just include Indians; they also include foreign nationals who enter Indian territory with the intent of undermining government operations. An example of this can be seen in the Mumbai Terror Attacks, where foreign nationals carried out an attack directed both at the nation and its citizens.

Joining or organizing a revolt against the government is considered waging war, although it does not include overt activities such as gathering troops, weapons, and ammunition, nor does it include inter-country warfare including military operations between nations.


The Indian Penal Code of 1860 did not initially have Section 121A; nevertheless, it was inserted in 1870 as a result of a code modification. It was changed in 1951 only to substitute “State” for “British India” upon independence. The conspiracy to conduct offences covered by Section 121 is covered in this section. The punishment in the following cases is covered under Section 121 A of the IPC:

  • Conspiracy to use or show unlawful force to frighten the government, or
  • Conspiracy to commit an offence as defined under Section 121 of the Indian Penal Code, which is applicable even outside of India.

When two or more people agree to do an unlawful act or a legal act through illegal methods, even if the act does not constitute abetment, it will still be deemed an offence under this section. The Central and State governments have the authority to impose the following penalties under this section: ten years in jail or life in prison with a fine. It is not required for any unlawful act or omission to occur for there to be a conspiracy under this provision.


Section 122 of the Code addresses the acquisition of weapons and other related materials to wage war against the Indian government. It addresses how war is prepared for. The penalty in the event is specified in Section 122 of the IPC.

  • A gathering of troops, weapons, or ammunition must be accompanied by the will to wage war or the readiness to wage war.
  • Additionally, the Indian government is the target of the conflict.
    However, purpose needs to exist at the same time that this preparation occurs. Life in jail or 10 years in prison plus a fine is the penalty under this provision. The Sessions court has the authority to triage, make a judgment, and compound the offence under this provision.


Under the Code, any conduct or unlawful omission that has the purpose of aiding in the plan to wage war is covered under Section 123. The offence of concealing the plan to wage war is defined in Section 123 of the Indian Penal Code. It establishes the following components of an offence and their respective penalties:

  • There has to be a plan in place to carry out warfare.
  • If the accused knows the design, they must take any action or fail to disclose it.
  • The Act in question is in opposition to the Indian government.

A ten-year jail sentence and a fine are the penalties under this provision. According to this clause, the Sessions court has the authority to triage, establish cognizance, and impose no bail. This clause held the accused responsible for the Parliament assaults because he knew both the terrorists’ plot and the conspiracy, and he had illegally omitted this information.



The punishment for attacking a governor, president, or other high official is outlined in Section 124 of the Indian Penal Code. The following are the necessities covered in this section:

  • The President of India, the Governor of State, or another public figure should have been the target of an attack or attempt at assault;
  • alternatively, the accused should have been involved in an attempt at unlawful restraint or in the act of wrongful restraint itself.
  • The accused ought to have stopped them from carrying out their duties and using force or intimidation to exercise their authority.

The main goal of this section is to foster an environment of fearlessness so that senior officials may work effectively and carry out their tasks without worry for their safety. A seven-year jail sentence and a fine are the penalties under this clause. The Sessions court has jurisdiction over the offence, and it is not subject to bail, compounding, or triage.


Sedition is included under Section 124A of the Code. Originally intended to be clause 113 of Macaulay’s draft Penal Code of 1837, this clause was subsequently enforced in the Indian Penal Code of 1870 for irrational reasons.

Sedition is the attempt to upset the peace of the State or to incite hatred, disdain, or discontent toward the State by gatherings, speeches, or publications. This discontent or animosity can be expressed verbally or in writing, or it can be shown by signs, images, etc. Sedition is considered a social offence.

In this section, sentiments of animosity and disloyalty are included under the word “dissatisfaction.” Sincere critiques of the government are permitted under this clause. It follows that using harsh language to criticize government policies or actions while hoping for improvements does not constitute sedition if it is done so without inciting hatred, disdain, or discontent.

This provision provides the following penalties for sedition: life in prison with the possibility of a fine, up to three years in jail plus a fine, or merely a fine. This is a triable offence that may be brought before the Sessions court. It is also not subject to bail.

Since the Constitution’s ratification, there has been debate concerning Section 124A’s constitutionality. The argument that Section 124A was ultra vires to the Constitution because it contravenes Article 19(1)(a), which addresses freedom of speech and expression, was made in the Tara Singh v. State [2] case. In this instance, the court held that the polity of modern India did not make Section 124A relevant. However, appropriate constraints on the right to free speech and expression were imposed in 1951 with the addition of Constitutional Amendment 19(2), which used the phrases “in the interest of” and “public order.”

The Supreme Court settled the contentious legal issues surrounding Section 124A in the historic Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar case. The highest court, in this case, ruled that the fundamental factor that legislation must take into account to punish any offence committed against the State is the security of the State, which depends on law and order. The freedom of speech and expression is a fundamental right guaranteed by our Indian constitution and is the prerequisite for a democratic government. Therefore, laws about this matter have the right to safeguard and uphold it. However, freedom must be ensured that it doesn’t turn into a weapon against the legally created government by using any phrases that encourage violence or have the potential to stir up discontent or disruption in the community.


The offences that directly harm India’s ties with other countries are primarily covered under Sections 125–127 of the Indian Penal Code.


Warfare against any Asian Power that allies with the Indian government is covered by Section 125 of the Code. The universal duty that all nations have to respect one another and pledge to live in peace forms the foundation of this section. This part of the Code has been reserved exclusively for this purpose since India has always maintained amicable relations with all other nations. According to Section 125 of the IPC, the offence must have the following fundamental elements:

  • The defendant ought to try to start a war or assist in one.
  • Any Asian Power’s government ought to be the target of the conflict.
  • India and the Asian powers must be at peace or in an alliance.

A fine may also be imposed as part of the punishment for this type of offence, which carries a maximum sentence of seven years in jail or life imprisonment.


The Code’s Section 126 addresses depredation on areas under power that are peacefully governed by the Indian government. When there is a widespread threat to everyone inside the region, the act of assaulting or what amounts to robbing is referred to as depredation. In contrast to Section 125, which solely covers Asian powers, this section covers countries that have peaceful relations with the state. The offence of – is covered under Section 126 IPC.

  • Engaging in any damage or depredation, or planning to engage in any harm or depredation
  • States with India in peace or alliance.

A seven-year jail sentence, a fine, and the forfeiture of any property obtained or used in connection with the offence are the penalties stipulated in this provision. The same penalty is applied in this section to both the act and its preparation. This is a triable offence that may be brought before the Sessions court. It is also not subject to bail.


In essence, Section 127 of the IPC addresses the penalty for obtaining property even after knowing that it has been obtained by the commission of any of the offences specified in Sections 125 and 126, respectively. The following are key points of the section:

  • Property obtained by the accused must exist.
  • The property has to be acquired via engaging in hostilities or plundering the Indian government.
    A seven-year jail sentence, a fine, and forfeiture of property are the penalties under this law. This means that any property obtained via fighting a war against an Asian country or by plundering land that is under peace with the Indian government is illegal under this provision. It is a cognizable offence that is triable before the Sessions court and is not subject to bail.

Among this section’s main goals is to prevent such individuals from using Indian territory as a haven for those who have obtained such properties by breaking sections 125 and 126 of the Code. An offender does not have to be tried or found guilty under Provision 125 or Section 126 to be found guilty under this provision.


The Indian Penal Code’s Sections 128 through 130 address offences about aiding and abetting state prisoners. Thus, harbouring or rescuing the prisoner falls under the expanded definition of Section 130 of the IPC.


A public official who willingly helps a prisoner of war or state to escape is covered under Section 128 of the Code. A public official faces life in prison or a ten-year sentence in jail, as well as a fine if they have control of a prisoner and willingly enable him to escape from any facility where he is being held.

It is a cognizable offence that is triable before the Sessions court and is not subject to bail. Section 21 of the Code defines “public servant,” and Section 39 of the Code defines “voluntarily.” These definitions apply to the terms “public servant” and “voluntarily” used here.


Section 129 of the Code addresses situations in which a public official carelessly permits a prisoner of war who is in their custody to escape or carelessly permits a prisoner to escape from their custody or place of detention.

Because the offence was the result of carelessness, the public worker faces simple imprisonment for a maximum of three years in addition to a fine. The Court of Session, Metropolitan Magistrate, and Magistrate of First Class have the authority to cognizably, bailable, non-compoundable, and try cases about the offence under this provision.


The Code’s Section 130 addresses helping these prisoners of war flee, saving them, or sheltering them. Any individual who knowingly helps a prisoner of state or war escape from custody, attempts to save or harbour one of these prisoners, or attempts to offer resistance to the prisoner’s capture, will be punished with life in prison or a maximum of ten years in prison, in addition to possibly paying a fine. According to this clause, the offence is triable in the Sessions Court, cognizable, and not subject to bail.
Unlike sections 128 and 129 of this Code, which are restricted to the culpability of public officers alone, this section is a general law that applies to everyone. This clause also has a very broad scope because it states that it is illegal to intentionally provide assistance or aid, rescue or seek to rescue, harbour or conceal, or give or attempt to offer resistance.

Any State prisoner who is granted release within certain boundaries of Indian territory will be considered to have escaped custody if he exceeds that boundary.


Article 120 to Article 130 of Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code lists the offences against the state; however, several other parts of the IPC must also be understood to fully comprehend the issue and have a thorough debate on it.

Even while the offences that will be covered in more detail do not directly target the state or the government, they are still harmful to the country’s progress because they incite hatred, animosity, and fear among different social strata. Public order can be seriously disturbed and strained by any of these offences.


Promotion of hate amongst various groups on the grounds of religion, language, race, place of birth, domicile, etc., or any other conduct that is harmful to the maintenance of harmony and peace is defined as an offence against the state under Section 153 A of the IPC.


To put it more simply, it refers to any action that seeks to sow discord and unhappiness amongst various groups based on factors like race, religion, language, sect, place of birth, or place of residency, ultimately fostering animosity between various communities. This section covers enough ground to include:
words that encourage or aim to encourage such hostility, whether they be said or written, orally or in writing, orally or by visible expression.

actions such as planning drills, exercises, or any other similar activities that might teach participants to use violent or criminal force, or that are motivated by the awareness that the activity in question could have the aforementioned effects.
This section mainly applies in situations where it can be determined that a specific action or statement is serious enough to incite violence or hatred, or is likely to incite fear or alarm among members of a particular caste, community, racial, or religious group. As per this provision, the court may determine appropriate punishment, which might include a fine, a term of up to three years, or both.


When an offence comparable to the ones listed above is committed in a house of worship, another religious gathering, etc., this section also stipulates a harsher penalty. It involves paying a fine, serving a maximum of five years in jail, or doing both. According to both sections, the offence is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and subject to a magistrate of the first class trial.


The legislation about imputations or claims that are harmful to national unity is outlined in Section 153 B of the IPC.


The offences listed in Section 153 B (1) of the IPC essentially comprise those in which any person, by spoken or written words, by tangible representations, by signs, or by any other means:

Makes, claims, publishes, suggests, spreads, initiates an appeal, or provides advice on any matter that is meant to imply that any specific group of individuals due to their identification as members of a caste, religion, race, language, area, or community
Ought not to be refused the opportunity to live as Indian citizens, or have their right to the country’s Constitution and laws respected and upheld.

or anything else that can provoke a class of individuals to feel animosity, hostility, or malice toward others.
It can involve a maximum sentence of three years in jail, a fine, or both.


For the identical offence as listed in sub-section (1), but only if it is done in a place of worship or during a religious assembly, see Section 153 B (2). This sub-section further increases the penalty to five years in jail and a fine. According to both sections, the offence is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and subject to a magistrate of the first class trial. For the identical offence as listed in sub-section (1), but only if it is done in a place of worship or during a religious assembly, see Section 153 B (2). This sub-section further increases the penalty to five years in jail and a fine. According to both sections, the offence is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and subject to a magistrate of the first class trial.


The act of purposefully and maliciously attempting to offend the religious beliefs of any class of Indian citizen by defaming them is defined as an offence under Section 295 A of the IPC. Words, written or spoken, signs, and visual representations can all fall under this category. Just the most egregious acts of religious insulting that are committed with the specific goal to offend any class’s religious sentiments are punishable under this clause. At the request of purportedly harmed complainants, the police may file a formal complaint (FIR) in any part of the nation under Section 295A of the IPC, which is a cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable offence.

The accused is required to disparage or make an effort to disparage any class of Indian nationals’ religion or religious beliefs. The aforementioned insult had to have been committed with the intentional intent to offend the religious feelings of the targeted group of people. The offence in question must be expressed verbally or in writing, by signals, visually, or in some other way.

The punishment for violating this clause is a maximum sentence of three years in jail, a fine, or both. The offence is cognizable, subject to a magistrate of the first class trial, and not subject to bail.


A person may face up to three years in prison, a fine, or both for making or spreading statements or rumours that are intended to incite public unrest, foster hatred between various social or religious groups, or inspire mutiny or fear among military personnel. If the incident occurs in a place of worship, the punishment may also include up to five years in jail and a fine.


It lays forth penalties for producing, publishing or disseminating any kind of report, rumour, or statement, with the following outcomes possible. It must be combined with the knowledge or purpose to cause or to know that the act is likely to produce:”-
Encouraging a soldier, airman, officer, or sailor in the Indian Army, Air Force, or Navy to engage in insurrection or convince them not to perform their duty as required.

People who are in a state of terror and panic may be motivated to commit crimes against the government or the public peace.
To persuade a certain class or group to perpetrate an offence against another class or community,
This section’s penalty can be carried out for a maximum of three years, together with a fine or both. The offence can be tried by a magistrate of any class and is not cognizable, bailable, compoundable, or compoundable.


The publication, dissemination, or making of any such remark with the knowledge or purpose to incite hatred or animosity amongst the classes is also covered under Section 505(2). jail sentence with a maximum term of three years, a fine, or both. This is a punishable offence that can be brought before a magistrate of any class, without the need for bail.


Furthermore, Section 505 (3) specifies the penalty for committing the aforementioned offence specified in Sub-Section (2) at any place of worship or religious rite. fine and a maximum five-year sentence of imprisonment. The crime can be brought to court by a magistrate of any class, and it is not subject to bail or compounding.


This Section specifically states that anybody in India who abets—that is, encourages or helps in the commission of any conduct carried out outside of India that, if carried out inside of India, would have been considered an offence—may face consequences. According to Section 108A of the Indian Penal Code, if someone helps or encourages the conduct of an act outside of India that would be illegal if done inside the country, they may be held legally responsible for abetting the crime in India.


We now have enough background information to be able to comprehend the process that will be followed for the prosecution of offences against the state after discussing all of the aforementioned parts.

Section 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 governs the process for prosecuting offences against the state. The same process applies to all other sections indicated above, in addition to the offences covered in Chapter VI of the IPC. Additionally, since there is a plausible connection between each of these offences, this also makes sense.


Clause 1 of Section 196 of the CrPC. states that no court may consider matters listed under

  • Crimes against the state, Chapter VI of the IPC
  • The Indian Penal Code’s Section 153 A, which encourages animosity between various groups
  • Section 295 A of the IPC (which intentionally aims to offend the religious sentiments of certain social strata)
  • The Statements Causing Public Mischief paragraph (1) of Section 505 of the IPC
  • Assistance in committing any of the offences listed in the aforementioned provisions
  • The type of assistance covered under IPC 108 A

Unless and until the State Government and the Center have already granted their approval


In general, cognizance refers to “knowledge” or “awareness.” However, “cognizance of offences” really refers to the court hearing on the case in a legal sense. It is the initial action taken before the start of any trial.

Although the term “cognizance” is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, the Supreme Court has interpreted it very well in several judgments. Drawing from the court’s rulings in the cases of R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. and Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, it can be determined that the act of “cognizance of offence” need not always entail a formal procedure; rather, it can occur as soon as a magistrate evaluates the case’s facts and determines the offence for legal proceedings.

It is important to emphasize, however, that cognizance does not begin when a magistrate exercises his or her judgment to take an action—such as granting a search warrant for investigative purposes—instead of doing so to advance a legal case. Keeping in mind the parameters of the Section, this topic will be further clarified.


Any magistrate of first class or a magistrate of second class (when authorized by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in this regard) may take cognizance by Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. in one of three ways: by receiving:

  • A formal report of the offence
  • The crime police report
  • Knowledge of the offence through one’s knowledge or information from another offence

The crucial point to grasp in this situation is that while Section 190 applies to all general offences, it does not apply to the offences listed under Section 196 of the CrPC. Following this, we shall continue to comprehend Section 190, clause 1A of the CrPC.


Clause 1A of Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code states that no court may find an offence covered by

  • Statements or imputations harmful to national integration are covered under Section 153 B of the IPC.
  • Statements creating public mischief under Subsection (2) or Subsection (3) of Section 505 of the IPC
  • or a criminal plot to carry out such an act,

Unless and until the District Magistrate, the State Government, or the Federal Government has already approved. An explanation of the section’s scope can be found by attempting to determine the answers to the following queries.

1. Is receiving discipline a requirement for being found guilty of any of the offences listed above, or is there an exception to this rule in some particular circumstances?
There is no room for uncertainty or ambiguity in the answer to this question; it is straightforward and concise. The legislature’s objective is very obvious when the word “shall” is used. that before the court may consider any of the offences covered by Section 136 of the Cr.P.C., it is necessary to have prior approval from an appropriate body. Therefore, Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. will not be applied, and this condition cannot be broken. Furthermore, the lawsuit will be void in legal eyes even if the court decides to take it on.


In the State v. Satpal Singh Etc. case, the court determined that the issuing of a warrant constituted a sine qua nonnecessity for taking cognizance of offences listed under Section 196 of the CrPC. The accused in this case was charged under Section 295(A) with intentionally harming Sardar Gurubachan Singh’s religious feelings by chopping off his hair.

However because the accused was not given the sanction required by Section 196 of the CrPC., the court releases them. Thus, in terms of jurisdiction, the lack of sanction is seen as a fundamental flaw that cannot be fixed by Section 465 of the Code.

2. Does this provision allow for the imposition of sanctions after the offence has been given legal notice, or does it mean that the word “previous” has to be understood to mean that the imposition of sanctions must occur before the offence is given legal notice?
The aforementioned query might be answered by pointing out that an offence cannot be recognized without first receiving a sanction from the proper authorities. It simply indicates that there is no opportunity under this Section to achieve the sanction once the offence has been recognized. Legally speaking, it will be regarded as void. The following case law can be used to support this.


In this instance, the State Government was not consulted beforehand as required by Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, despite the Judicial Magistrate of First Class attempting to take cognizance of the offence under consideration under Sections 124 A, 153 A, and 153 B. As per the case circumstances, the offence was recognized on March 5, 2016, and the penalty was given on August 16, 2016.

Before the court was the question of whether the procedures that took place after the date of cognizance might be made valid by the sanction that was granted later.

By recognizing the offence without first imposing any sanctions, the trial court went beyond its authority, according to the ruling of the High Court. As there was no adherence to Section 196 of the Cr.P.C., it cannot be dismissed as a case of procedural irregularity that might be fixed after the fact.

This point is addressed individually below and is another crucial question that the court addressed in the case cited above.

3. If the accused is charged with offences other than those listed in Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, would he be entitled to avoid being prosecuted for those additional general offences if no sanction from the relevant body is obtained?
The State of Madhya Pradesh and Sarfaraz Sheikh were the parties to the aforementioned case. The accused was charged with violating sections 147, 149, and 188 IPC in addition to violating sections 124-A, 153-A, and 153-B (which are specified under Section 196 of Cr. P.C.).
Given that the offence was recognized by the court, the subsequent sentence was not acceptable. The court’s ruling that the prosecution under Sections 124-A, 153-A, and 153-B could not be continued is evident from this. Regarding general offences, however, the Court ordered that the facts about Sections 147, 149, and 188 of the IPC were linked to and inseparable from the charges under consideration under Section 196 of the CrPC. in the charge sheet provided by the police.

The accused will thus be prosecuted under the other general offences, the Court determined. The state must submit an additional charge sheet, though, to do that.

4. Does filing a report without getting permission to register or investigate a matter constitute a breach of Section 196 of the Cr. P. C.?

The Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that there is no prohibition on the police agency from registering a criminal case, conducting an investigation, or submitting a report after the investigation is concluded, as required by Section 173 CrPC.
It simply implies that upon registration of a criminal case, an investigation is conducted, and the police present their findings to a magistrate even in the absence of prior approval from the district magistrate, state government, or federal government. Both the legal system and the parties involved will not see it as invalid or as a breach of Section 196(1-A) Cr.P.C.

5. When a responsible authority transfers the jurisdiction to impose sanctions on another authority, is such transfer permitted by law?

In some circumstances, the answer to the question above is indeed true. Delhi was carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the State Government by a Presidential Notification issued under Article 239 (1) of the Indian Constitution in the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, Administrator of Union Territory Ltd. Governor.” By the Government of NCT of Delhi Act, 1991, the court determined that the sanction granted by the Lieutenant Governor under Article 136 of the CrPC. was legitimate. There was no discernible impact on the validity of the sentence in this instance from the delegation of authority.


Procedures for prosecuting conspiracies that intend to commit crimes against the state are outlined in Section 196 Clause (2). In line with this clause, no court may try an offence covered by clause 120 B of the IPC unless the State government or the District Magistrate has provided written authorization.

Under Section 120 B, the Court may find jurisdiction over the following offences: criminal conspiracy to commit a crime for which the sentence is capital punishment, life in prison, or harsh imprisonment for two years or more.

In addition, the court does not need permission in cases where Section 195 of the Cr.p.c.The following case law will be used to assist us in comprehending the nuances of Section 136 (2).

According to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, an accused person may be charged with additional offences related to the criminal conspiracy, but they must have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. These additional offences are those whose commission does not call for any prior approval.

Then, even if the sanctioned requirement under Section 196(2) is not met, the Court may begin proceedings against such broad offences. It won’t matter if they were carried out to further the illegal scheme.

Furthermore, in criminal conspiracy proceedings involving the suppression of evidence connected to the commission of an offence or conspiracies to absolve the perpetrator of legal consequences, Section 196(2) is likewise not applicable. So, starting legal action for a criminal conspiracy of this kind does not need to receive any previous approval.


In essence, Section 196(3) of the CrPC. specifies the process that must be followed before a suitable Authority orders a penalty. By Section 196(3), before a penalty

  • by the federal government or state government by subsection (1) or subsection (1A); and
  • by the district magistrate by subsection (1A).
  • Under Sub-Section (2), the State Government or the District Magistrate

may, with the same authority as that considered under Subsection (3) of Section 155, direct a preliminary investigation to be conducted by an officer not lower than the rank of inspector (that generally deals with the information of non-cognizable cases and investigation to such instances).


It is crucial to read subsections (1) and (3) of section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code together to make the legal position very evident. The competent authority may order the Investigating Officer (I.O.) to conduct additional investigation if, after carefully reviewing the material or report submitted by the I.O., the authority is unhappy with the information provided. This means that if the authority believes that additional evidence is needed to make a decision or that the material submitted is insufficient to support the sanction, it may be necessary to gather more information.

The relevant authority shall make its ultimate determination based on all of the material. Thus, if the aforementioned body grants the sanction, it will fulfil the condition as stated in Section 196 (1) of the CrPC.


In the case of State of Karnataka & Anr vs Pastor P. Raju, decided on August 4, 2000, the Supreme Court overturned a High Court ruling that said permission could not be given out right away following the filing of a formal complaint, nor could it be used before the investigation was finished or all the evidence had been gathered.


In layman’s words, it may also be said that sanctioning or not sanctioning is only an executive role and not a judicial duty. Therefore, it does not matter if the executive makes the decision to grant or revoke a punishment and provides logic or supporting data.

It is imperative that the relevant authority seems to have considered the facts and circumstances surrounding the offence and made a judgment in light of those findings. This discussion aims to shed further light on a few significant, recent instances that deal with the same element.


The Supreme Court ruled in the State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu case that the inclusion of a single inapplicable clause in an order should not be interpreted as evidence of a lack of application of mind by the relevant authority.

In this instance, the penalty that the responsible authority imposed included significant writing errors, which made it difficult to determine whether or not the authority’s credibility was called into doubt. It so occurred that the infraction under POTA was not sanctioned; instead, penalties under the IPC were imposed for offences that did not apply, including Sections 121, 121A, 122, 124, and 120B. Additionally, the primary offence known as “POTA” was relegated to a residuary word that was used “along with other offences.”

The Supreme Court harshly criticized the sentence’s wording, but ultimately found that even if the IPC’s provisions were utilized in place of POTA, the sanction was only granted once it was determined by the relevant authorities that the accused intended to launch a war against the nation. According to the court’s opinion, a reasonable interpretation of the context in which the phrase “along with other offences” was used would suggest that POTA offences were being discussed.

Thus, it may be inferred that authorization was properly granted for the accused’s prosecution for POTA offences.


Vali Siddappa and Others, etc. vs. the State of Karnataka is another fascinating case. On November 11, 1997, it was decided that the sanction was declared unlawful and unsustainable in the eyes of the law due to the responsible authority’s failure to exercise due diligence.

In this instance, the appropriate authorities issued conflicting directives—that is, they authorized the penalty while also directing the I.O. to look into the matter by section 196(1) of the CrPC. The dilemma of imposing the sanction until the inquiry is finished and the evidence is gathered arises, much like when a directive is provided to the I.O. under section 196(3), CrPC.
The prosecution against the accused was consequently invalidated by the court, which concluded that a criminal procedure that followed such a void sanction order could not be regarded as a legally sustained criminal prosecution in the law.


Facts: On August 5, 2019, the Supreme Court issued a crucial ruling in the matter of Mohd. Waris Raza v. State. In the current instance, neither the State government nor the District Magistrate imposed any sanctions by Section 136 of the Cr.p.c., which is the prerequisite for Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). Interestingly, though, the accused did not voice any protest of this kind before the magistrate or even before the session judge following the committal. The appeal before the High Court was the first instance in which the question was raised.

Issue: The main question on the court’s agenda was whether the Section 196 CrPC. requirement of a “prior sanction” was so fundamental and inherent that its non-compliance, even if it wasn’t brought up before the trial court or the magistrate, could potentially invalidate the trial and conviction if it was brought up in an appeal for the first time.

Contention: According to the state prosecutor, the subordinate court’s decision cannot be invalidated since the issue of the lack of a prior sanction was submitted during the appellate process and cannot be accepted.

Furthermore, he argued that the penalty could not be utilized at the appellate stage as a basis to vitiate the proceedings by section 465 Cr.P.C. because it is fundamentally a component of the procedural requirement provided under Section 196 Cr.P.C. The Court of Appeal is not permitted to amend any ruling, judgment, sentence, or order rendered by a court with competent authority due to a mistake, omission, or irregularity in the prosecution’s penalty, as stated quite clearly in Section 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Judgment: After conducting an inquiry, the court found that only the terms “error or irregularity” and “omission” were used about the term “sanction” under Section 465 of the Cr.P.C. Thus, it is implied that in the event of an irregularity or error, the observation or finding will not be overturned in the court of appeals; nevertheless, in the event of a total omission, Section 465 of the Cr.P.C. will not be applicable. Given that the state in this instance never attempted to secure approval from an appropriate body

The court therefore dismissed the case’s proceedings and expressed the opinion that, if no sanction was granted by a competent authority by Section 136 of the Cr.P.C., this would constitute a major defect that may potentially be brought before the court of appeals for the first time. If the penalty was acquired due to irregularities or errors, the appeal court is not permitted to invalidate the proceedings.


A competent authority must give prosecution fair thought before any innocent person may be prosecuted arbitrarily or frivolously, which is why Section 196 Cr.P.C. aims to prevent such prosecutions from occurring.

One way to look at this is in the context of the prosecution of a delinquent, which begins as soon as the court finds evidence of an offence. It all tramples on an individual’s right to privacy and self-determination. So, to guarantee the proper administration of justice and fairness, the need to have a previous sanction is crucial.


We are in a position to make some logical and acceptable conclusions after having such a thorough discussion on the offences against the state, numerous other offences, their procedural requirements, and the need for a legal sentence. First and foremost, it’s critical to understand the type of penalty that is covered by Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which was established with careful consideration to guarantee the impartial administration of justice.

However, there are still some significant gaps that impede the application of due process of law. These shortcomings, in general, are not the result of drafting errors but rather stem from how the provision is put into practice.
In the past, there have been several instances when the officers and authorities in charge of carrying out the inquiry and issuing or rescinding punishments have shown a clear lack of competence, thoroughness, and expertise. In certain cases, the relevant authority fails to conduct due diligence or cites incorrect portions, in other cases the penalties are not obtained from a competent body, and in yet other cases the need for a penalty has been disregarded. This might be due to several factors, including corruption, indolence, or a lack of expertise or understanding.

The worst thing, though, is that the authority in question faces serious repercussions for adopting such a mindset. This essentially leads to a postponement of justice or even the escape of the offenders, who had the facts been presented differently, may have been found guilty or given a punishment that was both reasonable and appropriate. Therefore, to solve this issue, the relevant authorities must handle these instances with sufficient sincerity and compassion.

Hope now you know about (Crpc) Prosecution of Offenses Against the State but still if you have doubts then for experts guidance contact the famous criminal lawyers in bangalore

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